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A map of dependencies among three-valued logics
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a b s t r a c t
Three-valued logics arise in several fields of computer science, both inspired by concrete
problems (such as in the management of the null value in databases) and theoretical con-
siderations. Several three-valued logics have been defined. They differ by their choice of
basic connectives, hence also from a syntactic and proof-theoretic point of view. Different
interpretations of the third truth value have also been suggested. They often carry an epi-
stemic flavor. In this work, relationships between logical connectives on three-valued func-
tions are explored. Existing theorems of functional completeness have laid bare some of
these links, based on specific connectives. However we try to draw a map of such relation-
ships between conjunctions, negations and implications that extend Boolean ones. It turns
out that all reasonable connectives can be defined from a few of them and so all known
three-valued logics appear as a fragment of only one logic. These results can be instrumen-
tal when choosing, for each application context, the appropriate fragment where the basic
connectives make full sense, based on the appropriate meaning of the third truth-value.
1. Introduction
Classical Boolean logic is unique in the sense that the definition of its basic connectives is not questionable and there is
complete agreement on its model-based semantics. On the contrary, there exists a large body of scattered literature on 3-
valued logics. Formal three-valued logic systems have been studied by various mathematicians, providing axiomatizations
in the Hilbert or Gentzen style, and investigating their algebraic properties. There are well-known three-valued logics, like
Łukasiewicz [10] or Kleene [38], and less known ones like Sobocin´ski’s [56] and Nelson’s [47]. There seems to be no agree-
ment about what these logics are good for and what should be the definition of their logical connectives. Nevertheless, they
turned out to be useful in various areas, as heterogeneous as logic programming [29], electronic circuits [55] and databases
[19], among other topics. Three-valued logics can also be viewed as special kinds of fuzzy logics [33], where the truth set is a
chain of three elements. Fuzzy logics, that often assume the truth-set is infinite, have received considerable attention in the
last 15 years. It is thus interesting to go back to the most elementary case not reducible to Boolean logic. As fuzzy logic
underlies fuzzy sets, three-valued logics lead to three-valued sets, that can be modeled by pairs of nested sets or orthopairs
of disjoint sets [11,62]. Several kinds of generalized sets can be associated with three-valued logics: rough sets [16], condi-
tional events [60], shadowed sets [49], interval sets [61]. We note that even if similar mathematical frameworks underlie
these approaches, they have different semantics and usage. Such three-valued sets lead to three-way decision processes
[62], that leave room for a non-committal attitude that differs from the mere acceptance and rejection of options.
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One may argue that since Boolean logic is so basic for all kinds of scientific investigations, three-valued logic may be use-
ful and as basic for a number of useful reasoning tasks. However there is no clear consensus about this claim, and even there
is some confusion as to the potential uses of a third truth value, different from true and false. Indeed, there are various ways
of interpreting it. We can comment on some of them:
 Possible: this interpretation was proposed by Łukasiewicz [10], the pioneer of multivalued logic. He motivated his depar-
ture from bivalence by the wish do deal with future contingents in a truth-functional way. A proposition is Possible if its
truth-value will be only known in the future. Note that this question is better handled in temporal modal logics, nowa-
days, that is, Possible is more a modality than a truth-value.
 Unknown: this interpretation is proposed by Kleene [38] in 1952, and it is in some sense closely related to the previous
one. A proposition is unknown if its (Boolean) truth-value cannot be computed for some reason (for instance, it is too
time-consuming to do it). This interpretation has been very popular in various areas of computer science nowadays,
and may lead to paradoxes, if truth-functionality is enforced [57,27]. This view of the third truth-value also pervades
the intuitions behind interval sets [61] and rough sets [16]. It also suffers from a limited expressive power: it can only
account for epistemic states in terms of partial models, assigning an epistemic status to atoms only [23].
 Undefined: this is another proposal by Kleene, which applies to Boolean formulas viewed as recursive functions. The unde-
fined state corresponds to the choice of the argument of the function outside its definition domain. This kind of truth
value usually contaminates the result of the computation of the recursive function, that is the truth-value of a proposition
involving undefined atoms is Undefined.
 Half-true: This is typical of fuzzy logic [33]. The intuition is that for some propositions, truth is a matter of degree. So the
extension of the corresponding predicate involves elements that are peripheral, or borderline, as opposed to elements
that are central. This is very natural for representing some words in natural language like bird, tall, etc. A robin is a pro-
totypical bird (a central element) while a penguin is untypical as a bird (a peripheral element). The use of three-valued
sets in linguistics goes back to Gentilhomme [32]. In the case of words such as tall, the continuous representation of the
height scale pleads in favor of a truth set larger than 3, namely the unit interval for instance, as commonly used in fuzzy
logic. Shadowed sets [49] are based on the idea of turning fuzzy sets into three-valued sets using two cuts generalizing
the core and support of a fuzzy set.
 Irrelevant: the idea is that in some possible worlds, atomic propositions are not applicable. For instance, the proposition
‘‘My car is blue’’ is neither true nor false if I have no car. However, there is no contamination effect in this case, namely if a
component of a proposition is irrelevant, it is supposed not to take part in the evaluation of the truth of the whole. An
example of such a three-valued entity is a rule ‘‘if A then B’’, viewed as a conditional event BjA [26], A and B being Boolean
propositions. When the antecedent A is false, the rule BjA is irrelevant as it cannot be applied. So it has no role in the com-
putation of a logical combination with other rules.
 Inconsistent: the third value stands for a proposition which is both true and false, so, in some sense, it is the dual of
‘‘unknown’’. Several works try to tame the notion of contradiction by means of a truth value (for instance, Priest [50]
and Belnap [8]). The stance of some paraconsistent logics is to treat contradictions locally without losing inference capa-
bilities (for instance [2]). The possible confusion between usual truth-values and the notion of contradiction has been crit-
icized as also generating paradoxes [31,23].
The possible meanings of the third truth-value mentioned above are probably not exhaustive, but they are enough to lay
bare an opposition between two kinds of understanding of the third truth value, we could call ontological and epistemic,
respectively. The third truth-value is sometimes intrinsic to the definition of propositions: Undefined is needed for defining
partial functions, Half-true for defining gradual or fuzzy predicates, Irrelevant is intrinsic to the commonsense notion of a rule
that does not apply to some situations. Such truth-values are ontological, that is, satisfiability is defined in terms of inter-
pretations wp having three values [41]. On the other hand, Unknown and Possible refer to situations where the Boolean nat-
ure of propositions is not questioned but their truth or falsity has not been yet established, but can eventually be so, by
waiting for the proper moment, or by means of a stronger computer, or by bringing the proper information that is missing.
Such truth-values are epistemic. They refer to the state of knowledge of an agent relative to propositions that are ontolog-
ically Boolean. In this case, the third truth-value refers not to the proposition it is supposed to qualify, but to the state of
information concerning this proposition. These considerations drive us close to epistemic logics. The relationships between
three-valued logics and epistemic logics are studied in [18]. Here, we focus on the relationships among three-valued logics.
Clearly, Boolean connectives can be extended to three-valued logics in various ways, but there is only a finite number of
logical 3-valued functions of a given arity. Contrary to the Boolean case, where the basic connectives, say conjunction and
negation, are uniquely defined, there are degrees of freedom in 3-valued logics for the definition of such connectives. The
choice of connectives can be driven by the algebraic properties one may wish to salvage, given that the Boolean structure
is no longer possible. However this choice should also be driven by the preservation of Boolean tables for the two extreme
truth-values and by the meaning of the third one. For instance, if it means half-true one may argue that the conjunction of a
true proposition with an half-true one cannot be more than half-true in turn. In contrast if the third truth value means irrel-
evant, it looks plausible that the conjunction of a true proposition with an irrelevant one should remain true, as the second
proposition is viewed as counting for nothing.
In the following, we extend and complete our study [17] on three-valued connectives. First, we use a definition of con-
junction, implication and negation obeying minimal intuitively meaningful properties and show that there are only 14 dif-
ferent such conjunctions and implications, and 3 negations, on three-valued sets. We also discuss the relationships between
other definitions of conjunctions in many-valued logics, such as t-norms and uninorms [39]. Further, generalizing the con-
nections between implication, entailment and conjunction in classical logic, we study the relationships among all these oper-
ations via standard transformations involving or not an involutive negation [24,30] and classify them according to their
mutual behavior. It turns out that all the connectives can be mutually defined, so that starting from a simple structure
we can obtain all of them. Finally, we show that any binary connective is definable using Łukasiewicz logic connectives, pro-
vided that the third truth value is part of the language.
2. Connectives on three values
A three-valued set on the universe X can be defined as a mapping f: X´ 3, where 3 = ({F,N,T},>) is a chain of truth values.
Namely, the set {F,N,T} is equipped with the ordering relation T > N > F, often called the truth-ordering [8], with T meaning
true, F meaning false and N (for neutral) is the third truth-value standing in between. We denote by _ and ^ the maximum
and minimum operations on this set.
The structure (3,>) is the simplest bipolar scale, namely a scale where positive and negative areas are separated by a neu-
tral value. Given the importance of bipolarity in human cognition [28], one may suspect that some three-valued logics should
play in knowledge representation a role similar to Boolean logics for mathematical reasoning. However, there is no consen-
sus along this line so far, partly due to the multiplicity of possible three-valued systems. This is one of the motivations of this
paper, namely, study relationships between three-valued functions, and proceed toward isolating some ‘‘useful’’ three-val-
ued logics.
2.1. Conjunctions
First we give a general definition of a conjunction on 3. At the end of the section, other possible definitions are discussed.
Definition 1. A conjunction on 3 is a binary mapping ⁄: 3  3´ 3 such that
(C1) If x 6 y then x  z 6 y  z (left monotonicity);
(C2) If x 6 y then z  x 6 z  y (right monotonicity);
(C3) F  F = F  T = T  F = F and T  T = T (conformity with Boolean logic).
This is clearly a minimal definition. Note that N  F = F  N = F in all cases since N 6 T and due to (C1) and (C3) we get
N  F 6 T  F = F, and similarly F  N 6 F  T = F from (C2) and (C3). Now, by listing all the possible conjunctions on 3 we
get 14 possibilities, according to Table 1.
Table 1
All conjunctions on 3 according to Definition 1.
This framework, even if encompassing, is not able to cover some identified conjunction connectives, for instance, Kleene’s
weak conjunction for undefined (also known as Bochvar internal conjunction) [38,9] and McCarthy logic conjunction [46,40].
These conjunctions are indeed not monotonic, as N  F = N.
Other important usual properties for conjunction, not imperatively requested here, are commutativity, associativity and
the identity role played by T:
(C4) x  y = y  x (commutativity);
(C5) x  (y  z) = (x  y)  x (associativity);
(C6) T  x = x and x  T = x (identity).
As can be seen, only the conjunctions 1, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14 are commutative. Non-commutative conjunctions can be paired by
noticing they are mutually definable by swapping T and N, i.e., if T  N = a and N  T = b then THN ¼ b and NHT ¼ a for an-
other conjunctionw. These pairs of conjunctions are (3,4); (6,12); (7,9) and (10,13). When symmetrizing these conjunctions
we get the following result.
Proposition 1. Let ⁄0, ⁄00: 3´ 3 be defined as a 0 b:¼b 0 a = (a  b) ^ (b  a) and a 00 b = b 00 a = (a  b) _ (b  a). Then, we have:
 03 ¼ 
0
4 ¼ 5ðminÞ, ⁄
00
3 = ⁄
00
4 = ⁄2 (Sobocin´ski);
 06 ¼ 
0
7 ¼ 
0
9 ¼ 
0
12 ¼ 8 (Bochvar), ⁄
00
7 = ⁄
00
9 = ⁄11 (Łukasiewicz);
 010 ¼ 
0
13 ¼ 11(Łukasiewicz), ⁄
00
6 = ⁄
00
10 = ⁄
00
12 = ⁄
00
13 = ⁄14.
Proof. A straightforward application of ⁄0, ⁄00 definition to Table 1, where it is enough to consider the columns T  N, N  T and
take respectively the min and the max. h
Moreover only Łukasiewicz and Kleene conjunctions have identity T. They are associative conjunctions, a property satis-
fied by the majority of the 14 connectives. Łukasiewicz and Kleene conjunctions are the only two t-norms [39] remaining (in
this setting, Łukasiewicz t-norm is the least t-norm as well). Interestingly, Sobocin´ski conjunction has identity N, and is the
only one to be so, which makes it a good candidate for modeling irrelevance, and is also associative.
In conclusion, from the original 14 conjunctions, we get only 6 which are commutative. If we restrict our choice further to
the associative ones we get 5 solutions, which are the only ones with names, that is to say, the only ones in the table (to the
best of our knowledge) that have been studied in literature.
Remark 1. Other definitions of conjunction.There have been several other attempts to define generalized conjunctions in
the three-valued setting, that we review now.
2.1.1. Conjunctions of conditional events
In [60], Walker discussed how to extend Boolean conjunctions to conditional events of the form AjB representing rules of
the form if B then A. They can be represented by orthopairs of elements of a Boolean algebra (sets with empty intersection),
respectively corresponding to A \ B (examples of the rule) and Ac \ B (counterexamples), where Ac is the complement of set
A. The conditions he imposes on these conjunctions are: coincidence with Boolean conjunction on Boolean values {0,1},
idempotence and commutativity (we note that the same requirements are also used in [1]).
Then, due to the bijection between conditional events and three-valued sets, it is possible to interpret the operations as
three-valued truth tables. As a result, there are only nine possibilities, among which we can find weak Kleene, (strong) Kle-
ene and Sobocin´ski conjunctions. Sobocin´ski’s conjunction has been used to define a non-monotonic logic of conditionals
with three-valued semantics [26].
Table 2
Walker conjunctions (the original numbering is given).
The other six conjunctions are given in Table 2. We note that Walker also defines disjunction by De Morgan properties
with respect to the standard involutive negation.
Among these conjunctions, the only associative one is 4W and they are all non-monotonic. This behavior, as well as the
fact that NiWF ¼ T for i = 6, 7, 8, casts some doubts about their interpretability.
2.1.2. Uninorms
The idea is to generalize the notion of t-norm and t-conorm by letting any element e (usually, in the unit interval) be the
identity.
Definition 2 43. A uninorm is a binary operator which is associative, commutative, non-decreasing in each component and
with identity e: "x, e  x = x.
In the three-valued setting, we do not obtain any new connective, all the definable uninorms also satisfy Definition 1.
Proposition 2. The only 6 uninorms definable on 3 are: Łukasiewicz, Kleene and Sobocin´ski conjunctions and disjunction.
Proof. We can have three choices for the neutral element:
 the neutral element is e = T. Then we get a t-norm, which on three values comes down to Łukasiewicz and Kleene
conjunctions;
 if e = N, we get Sobocin´ski conjunction (operation 2 in Table 1) and disjunction. This conjunction is the only conjunctive
discrete uninorm [20], and the most elementary such connective (as there are no uninorms in the Boolean setting);
 if e = F we have a t-conorm, which on three values corresponds to Łukasiewicz and Kleene disjunction. h
2.1.3. t-operators
This is another generalization of t-norms on pre-ordered sets [42].
Definition 3 [43. A binary operator ⁄ on a finite scale {F < x1 < . . . < T} is named t-operator if it is associative, commutative,
such that F  F = F, T  T = T and it satisfies 1-smoothness: if xi  xj = xk then xiÿ1 xj, xi  xjÿ1 xk, xkÿ1.
Clearly, the following property holds.
Lemma 3. Definition 3 implies monotonicity conditions (C1) and (C2) in Definition 1.
Proof. Let us suppose that xi 6 xj then, we can find a chain xi 6 xi+1    6 xjÿ1 6 xj. Thus applying 1-smoothness and commu-
tativity we obtain (C1) and (C2). h
Proposition 4. On three-valued scales, there are only five t-operators: Kleene and Łukasiewicz conjunctions and disjunctions and
the aggregation operator in Table 3.
Proof. This result can be obtained by Lemma 3, requiring also condition if xi  xj = xk then xkÿ1 6 xi  xj on the associative and
commutative operations obtained in Table 1. Then, we see that the only operator satisfying Definition 3 and such that
T  F = F  T– F is the median operator. h
The peculiarity on the operator in Table 3 is that it does not generalize Boolean connectives: F and T yield the third value
N. In fact it is easy to see that it is the operation med(x,y,N) computing the median between x, y and N. It is known to be the
only associative operation between ^ and _, and a special case of Sugeno Integral.
2.2. Implications
We turn now our attention to the implication connective, starting again from a general definition, with requirements on
monotonicity and coincidence with classical logic on {F,T}.
Table 3
The median t-operator.
Definition 4. An implication on 3 is a binary mapping ? from 3  3 to 3 such that
(I1) If x 6 y then y? z 6 x? z;
(I2) If x 6 y then z? x 6 z? y;
(I3) F? F = T? T = T and T? F = F.
From the above definition we have
Proposition 5. From (I1)–(I3) it follows that for all x, x? T = T and, in particular, F? T = T.
Proof. From (I1) and y = z = T we have x 6 T implies T? T 6 x? T and by (I3) we get the thesis. h
Thus, this definition extends in a coherent manner the usual definition of material implication on {F,T}. This definition can
be found, for instance in [52,45] and is quite general. Nevertheless, as discussed in [45] it does not cover all existing impli-
cations, for instance, the weak Kleene implication [38]. Now, we list all definable implications according to Definition 4. It
yields the (incomplete) truth table in Table 4 on the top and the further monotonicity constraint N? NP {T? N,N? F}.
Thus, the three missing values can be filled also in this case in 14 different ways.
Additional interesting properties worth considering, are:
(I4) T? x = x (left neutrality or boundary condition);
(I5) x? y = T iff x 6 y (ordering property).
We remark that (I5) is considered by some authors [34,54] as a fundamental condition for implication. Table 4 summa-
rizes all possible implications in agreement with our definition, showing also the only two ones that satisfy additional con-
ditions I4 and I5. These connectives correspond to the restriction of infinite-valued Łukasiewicz and Gödel implications,
respectively defined for x, y 2 [0,1] as:
x!L y :¼minf1;1ÿ xþ yg
x!G y :¼
1 x 6 y
y x > y:

to the present three-valued setting. They are the t-norms residua [39,44] of Łukasiewicz and Gödel conjunctions.
Remark 2. The algebraic structure defined in order to treat at the same time Łukasiewicz and Gödel logic is known as
Heyting Wajsberg (HW) algebra [12]. We also note that HW algebras are equivalent to other well known structures, without
entering into details (see [13]) we mention:
Table 4
All implications according to Definition 4.
 MVD algebras, obtained adding a Baaz’s operator D [4,33] to MV algebras;
 Stonean MV algebra, a particular class of MV algebras introduced by Belluce [7].
 BZMVdM algebras, a pasting of MV algebras and BZ lattices [14];
On Table 4, we can see that among the 14 implications we also have the Kleene, the Gaines–Rescher, the Nelson [58,15],
the Sobocin´ski [56], the Jas´kowski2 [36] and the Sette [53] ones.
Remark 3. In his study on invariant fuzzy implications [22], Drewniak points out 18 implications which are minimal
‘‘invariant with respect to the family of bijections’’. Once considered on three values, they reduce only to nine implications,
which corresponds to implications 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14 in Table 4.
2.3. Negations
From the above implications we can derive in a standard way a negation as x0:¼x? F. Of course we can obtain only three
different negations depending on the value assigned to N0. Indeed, the negation of the Boolean values is constrained by F0 = T
and T0 = F. Thus, we can cluster the 14 implications in three groups, according to the negation they produce:
 N = F, that is we obtain an intuitionistic negation. Implications 1, 2, 4, 6, 10, 14 belong to this group.
 :N = N. In this case, the negation is involutive. The group includes implications 3, 5, 7, 11, 13.
 ÿN = T. This negation corresponds to a paraconsistent one. All remaining implications belong to this cluster, namely,
implications 8, 9, 12.
In Table 4, it is interesting to distinguish between implications that obey the contraposition law with respect to the invol-
utive negation and those which do not. Namely implications I1, I2 (Sobocin´ski), I5, I8, I11 (Łukasiewicz), and I14 (Gaines–
Rescher) are their own contraposed. Others go by pair made of an implication and its contraposed, namely (I3, I4)
(I6, I12), (I7, I9) (I10, I13). The involutive negation enables 14 disjunctions + to be generated from the 14 conjunctions ⁄ as
aþ b ¼ :ð:a  :bÞ. Using implications, disjunctions can also be obtained in the form aþ b ¼ :a ! b.
3. From Conjunction to Implication and Back
In [24,25] a generation process for fuzzy set connectives is introduced. It enables relationships among implications and
conjunctions to be laid bare. We now apply this methodology to the three truth values case.
Given a binary operation  on {F,N,T} and the standard involutive negation :F = T, :N = N, :T = F, we introduce the fol-
lowing transformations of :
a½EðÞb ¼ b a ðexchangeÞ ð1aÞ
a½CðÞb ¼ :b :aðcontrapositionÞ ð1bÞ
a½SðÞb ¼ :ða :bÞðmaterial implicationÞ ð1cÞ
a½RðÞb ¼
0 9= s; a s 6 b
supfs : a s 6 bg otherwise

ðresiduationÞ ð1dÞ
They can be used to generate one operation from another. In particular, from a non-commutative conjunction we can obtain
another conjunction with the exchange transformation E. From a conjunction, we can also respectively obtain two implica-
tions by residuation R and transformation S based on involutive negation only. The latter comes down to mimicking the
definition of material implication. Conversely, starting from an implication we can obtain another implication using contra-
position C and a conjunction by residuation R applied to an implication. Transformation S is involutive, as
a½S½SðÞb ¼ a b.
The interesting thing is that the application of E; C and S to the above discussed 28 connectives does not generate any
new connective. The same remark holds to a lesser extent for R. Below we present relationships between implications
and conjunctions induced from these transformations, clustered into four different classes corresponding to different
patterns.
3.1. Class 1: self-definable conjunctions-implications pairs: 1, 2 and 11
In this first pattern, implication and conjunction are mutually definable like in classical logic and no other operation is
obtainable by the transformations.
2 This implication is ascribed to Słupecki by Jas´kowski in [36].
With no surprise, in this group we find Łukasiewicz implication and conjunction (n.11). A formal axiom system for
(?11,⁄11,+11,:) is well-known, where +11 is the bounded sum. Also, Sobocin´ski logic [56] possesses an axiomatization based
on (?2,⁄2,+2,:) where +2 can be defined as x+2y:¼:x?2 y, and the designated values are both T and N. Here, the interpre-
tation given to the third value is irrelevant: moreover, the (conjunctive) discrete uninorm ⁄2 has implication?2 for its resid-
uum [5,43] (as also discussed later). We also note that Sette conjunction (n.1) corresponds to the collapse of the truth values
T and N. This also happens with Sette implication (n.6) which however appears in the schema of class 3. So the closure of
these sets of connectives for these transformations is not surprising.
Remark 4. We note that Sette logic has been obtained in [21] from Łukasiewicz logic with a view to demonstrate a
relationship between many-valued logic and paraconsistent logic. Given Łukasiewicz three-valued logic (with two
designated values), Sette operations are obtained as follows:
p ^Se q :¼ :ðp ^ qÞ !L ðp ^ qÞ
p!Se q :¼ JðqÞ !L JðpÞ
where J(p) = :p ^ Se:(p ^Se :p) and ^ denotes the minimum.
3.2. Class 2: implications {3,4,14} and {5,10,13}
Also this pattern is closed, but it involves three implications and three conjunctions.
Let us note that while most implications in these groups are well known (Jas´kowski (n.4), Gaines–Rescher (n.14), Kleene
(n.5) and Gödel (n.10)), only one conjunction (minimum, n.5) has focused attention in the literature. Indeed, when these
implications are put into a formal logical system, the considered conjunction is usually the minimum. More precisely, we
have three-valued Gödel logic (?10,⁄5,_,) which is the well-known intuitionistic (Heyting) logic plus the prelinearity ax-
iom (x? y) _ (y? x) and the Hosoi condition to obtain three values [35], or equivalently BL logic plus the idempotency of
the conjunction (a  a = a) [33] and again the three-valuedness condition. We note that this logic is also known in the Answer
Set Programming field as the here-and-there logic [48]. The logical system derived by Jas´kowski implication (?4,⁄5,_,:) has
been studied by several authors in the field of paraconsistent logic [21,2,3], where the designated values are N and T. It can be
proved equivalent to Sobocin´ski logic (n.2) through the following identities:
p!S q ¼ ðp!J qÞ ^ ð:q!J :pÞ ð2aÞ
p!J q ¼ q _ ðp!S qÞ ð2bÞ
3.3. Class 3: implications {6,12} and {7,9}
This pattern is not closed, that is Rð6Þ and Rð7Þ yield operations that do not belong to the 14 implications presented in
the previous sections.
In the above patterns, the value ’’out’’ means that the implication operatorRðÞ does not satisfy all the constraints of Def-
inition 4. Full truth tables of these external implications are given in Table 5.
As can be seen, the problem lies in the value of T !RðxÞ F which in cases x = 6, 7, 8 is N instead of F. These new connectives
do not extend classical logic. This is a consequence of a more general result which applies to all many-valued operators, not
just to the three-valued set 3, as proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Let ⁄ be a conjunction according to Definition 1. If $a– F such that T  a = F then T !RðÞ F – F.
Proof. By Eq. (1c) (residuation), we have that T !RðÞ F P a > F. h
Nevertheless, if from these implications we compute the corresponding conjunctions by S we obtain the connectives in
Table 6.
Note that the range of these operations is {F,N} only. In fact they are the minimum ^ðSðRð6ÞÞÞ and Łukasiewicz conjunc-
tion ðSðRð7ÞÞÞ, but for T  T = N. Now, with these operations, we note that the diagrams can commute again:
In the above patterns, we have a noticeable relationship between Sette implication (n.6) and Bochvar external one (n.12).
Moreover, we can define Sette conjunction (n.1) by means of Bochvar implication (n.12) and Bochvar conjunction (n.8)
through Sette implication (n.6).
p1q ¼ :ðð:p!12 :qÞ !12 :qÞ; p8q ¼ :ðð:p!6 :qÞ !6 :qÞ:
We also note that the converse relationships between operations 6/8 and 1/12 hold:
p12q ¼ :ðð:p!1 :qÞ !1 :qÞ; p6q ¼ :ðð:p!8 :qÞ !8 :qÞ:
To the best of our knowledge, the relationship between Sette and Bochvar implications has not been put forward previously
and it deserves some further investigation. Implication ?6 has been proved useful in a paraconsistent system [53]
(?6,⁄1, +1,ÿ) where +1 is the disjunction defined as:
xþ1y :¼
F if x ¼ y ¼ F
T otherwise

and designated values are N and T. It has the property that it cannot be strengthened, i.e., there is no propositional calculus
between this system and classical propositional logic. Bochvar system is defined as (?12,⁄8, +8,ÿ) where, likewise,
xþ8y :¼
T if x ¼ T or y ¼ T
F otherwise

It is part of a more complex framework, where two logics co-exist, an internal one where statements can be true, false or
meaningless and the external one which takes into account only meaningful (that is, true or false) statements. Finally, we
Table 5
Residuum of conjunctions ⁄6 and ⁄7.
Table 6
Operation S applied to the residuum of conjunctions ⁄6 and ⁄7.
note that Nelson implication (n.9) is used in Nelson logic, a system (?9,⁄5,_,:,ÿ) with two negations designed to differen-
tiate between refutations by counter-examples and reductio ad absurdum [47,58]. As discussed by Vakarelov [59], on three
values it is equivalent to Łukasiewicz logic (?11,:) through the following identities:
p!L q ¼ ðp!N qÞ ^ ð:q!N :pÞ ð3aÞ
p!N q ¼ p!L ðp!L qÞ ð3bÞ
ÿ p ¼ p!L :p ð3cÞ
3.4. Class 4: implication 8
In the last case, implication n.8 and Bochvar conjunction are stand-alone ones, featuring the same difficulty with the
residuation of the conjunction.
Both Bochvar conjunction and implication (n.12) can be seen as Boolean connectives through the collapse of the truth
values T and N.
The pseudo-implication obtained by Rð8Þ is strictly linked to Walker conjunctions. Indeed, once we consider the impli-
cations obtained by residuation of the six Walker conjunctions in Table 2, we get Sobocin´ski implication from conjunctions
3W and 
7
W , Gödel implication from 
6
W and from the other three conjunctions, namely 
2
W ; 
4
W ; 
8
W we have the implication?W
given in Table 7.
Implication?W is exactly the residuation of Bochvar conjunction (⁄8), marked as ‘‘out’’ in the above diagram. Moreover,
from?W we can define by contraposition another implication and then two other conjunctions by transformation S. Finally,
by applying again residuation to Sð!wÞ we get implication n.8 and from SðCð!wÞÞ we go back to Cð!WÞ. So, we can see that
the diagram involving implication?8 and Bochvar conjunction, can now be completed with a diagram of the same structure
as for class 2.
Of course, it should be noted that the semantics of the operations in Table 7 is problematic. For instance, the two impli-
cations are such that T? F– F and the two conjunctions are never true.
4. Reducibility of all connectives to one logic
We have seen that the 28 conjunction and implication connectives can be clustered into 8 groups and inside each group
we can define each connective starting from one of the others. In this section, we try to discover connections among these
groups. First, we remark that beyond the transformations in Eq. (1d) we have seen in Eqs. (2b) and (3c) that there are other
ways to define an implication ?new given another implication ?. Namely:
Table 7
Implication obtained from conjunctions 2W ; 
4
W ; 
8
W by residuation and derived connectives.
p!new q ¼ ðp! qÞ ^ ð:q ! :pÞ;
p!new q ¼ q _ ðp! qÞ;
p!new q ¼ p! ðp! qÞ;
and others can also be generated in a similar way:
p!new q ¼ ðp! qÞ _ ð:q ! :pÞ;
p!new q ¼ :p _ ðp ! qÞ:
If we systematically apply them to our 14 implications, we can see that we can link all the 8 groups as outlined in Fig. 1. In
this graph, every circle represents a group of conjunctions/implications related via transformations defined in the previous
section, and an arrow from one group to another indicate that the connectives in the latter can be derived from the connec-
tives in the former. In more details, the links we can obtain among implications with the above transformations are summa-
rized as in Table 8, (while the transformations inside the same group are omitted).
Further, we have already shown in Remark 4 how to obtain Sette implication and conjunction from Łukasiewicz impli-
cation and also the relationship existing among conjunction/implication 1–12 and 6–8 in Section 3.3. From all these connec-
tions, we note, in particular, the relationship between Kleene (n.5) and Jas´kowski implication (n.4), Bochvar (n.12) and
Nelson (n.9), and Gödel (n.10) and Łukasiewicz (n.11). The significance of all these relationships deserves some further study
both from the semantic and formal logic standpoint.
Fig. 1. Outline of all the relations among connectives.
Table 8
Relations among implications.
No. How it can be obtained Name
1 (p?3 q) ^ (:q?3 :p), (p?4 q) ^ (:q?4 : p) Sobocin´ski
2 :p _ (p?2 q)
3 q _ (p?1 q), q _ (p?2 q) Jas´kowski
4 :p _ (p?1 q), (p?3 q) _ (:q?3 :p), q _ (p?3 q) (strong) Kleene
(p?4 q) _ (:q?4 :p), :p _ (p?4 q)
5 Sette
6 :p _ (p?6 q)
7 (p?6 q) _ (:q?6 :p), (p?7 q) _ (:q?7 :p)
p?7 (p?7 q), (p?9 q) _ (: q?9 :p)
(p?12 q) _ (:q?12 :p)
8 p?11 (p?11 q), q _ (p?12 q) Nelson
9 q _ (p?14 q) Gödel
10 (p?7 q) ^ (:q?7 :p), (p?9 q) ^ (:q?9 :p) Łukasiewicz
(p?10 q) _ (:q?10 :p), :p _ (p?10 q),
(p?13 q) _ (:q?13 :p), p _ (p?13 q)
11 p?12 q = p?13 (p?13 q) Bochvar external
12 :p _ (p?14 q)
13 (p?6 q) ^ (:q?6 :p), (p?10 q) ^ (:q?10 :p) Gaines–Rescher
14 (p?12 q) ^ (:q?12 :p), (p?13 q) ^ (:q?13 :p)
As a consequence, we can see that from any operation of any group, it is possible to define all the other connectives, pro-
vided that we suppose our set 3 to be ordered, hence to be equipped with min (^), max (_) as well as to allow the use of
residuation and the involutive negation. In particular, we can start from very simple structures and show that all the con-
nectives are definable in such structures.
Proposition 7. Let 3 be the three-element set with the usual order F < N < T or equivalently, 3 ¼ ð3;^;_Þ, with 3 the set of three
elements without the order structure. All the 14 conjunctions and implications can be defined in any of the following systems:
 ð3;:;!10Þ ¼ ð3;^;:;!10Þ;
 ð3;!iÞ ¼ ð3;^;_;!iÞ where i 2 I = {3,5,7,11,13}.
Proof. The proof is straigthforward from the above discussion, the relationships outlined inside the groups and among them,
and the fact that from all implications ?i, i 2 I we can recover the involutive negation as :p = p?i 0. h
Note that the first item of the above proposition holds for any system (3,⁄i,:), (3,?i,:). Indeed, it is possible to obtain all
other connectives from any implication and any conjunction provided we have the order relation and the involutive nega-
tion. On the other hand, in some cases, we can even simplify the starting structure, since it is possible to obtain the order
from the implication.
Proposition 8. We denote by 3 the set of three elements without any structure. All the 14 conjunctions and implications can be
defined in any of the following systems (letting F be understood as a unary function always yielding F):
 ð3;!11; FÞ where ?11 is Łukasiewicz implication;
 ð3;!9;:Þ where ?9 is Nelson implication;
 ð3;!5;Þ where ?5 is Kleene implication and  the intuitionistic negation.
Proof. First, we see that the constant function F is definable in Kleene logic through the intuitionistic negation as (p?5 p)
and that the involutive negation is definable in Łukasiewicz and Kleene systems as :p:¼p?11 F = p?5 F. Then, the second
and third cases are reducible to the first one since
 in Nelson logic, Łukasiewicz implication is a?11 b:¼(p?9 q) ^ (:q?9 :p) and F:¼:(p?11 p);
 in Kleene logic, the Łukasiewicz implication can be defined as a?11 b:¼(:  :a _ b) ^ (:  b _ :a) using the intuitionis-
tic negation.
Now, we prove the proposition for the first case (and consequently for the other two). From Łukasiewicz implication, we
can obtain Nelson implication as p?11 (p?11 q) and consequently paraconsistent negation ÿ. Then, Gödel implication is
p?10 q:¼ ÿ (p?11 q)?11 q and then, we can obtain intuitionistic negation and implication ?13. From Nelson implication
we arrive at implication ?7 and from Gödel implication we also obtain Gaines–Rescher p?14 q = (p?10 q) ^ (: q?10 :p).
Then, we get (see Class 2 in the previous section) implications 3 and 4 (Jas´kowski) and from 4, we reach Sobocin´ski
implication?2. Bochvar implication is p?12 q:¼p?13 (p?13 q) and then we get Sette implication?6. Finally, from?6 we
obtain Sette conjunction p⁄1q = (((p?6 p)?6 p)?6 ÿ ((q?6 q)?6 q))?6 ÿ (p?6 ÿ q) and so implication ?1. Finally,
implication ?8 is definable for instance as p?7 (p?7 q) and then we get also Bochvar conjunction ⁄8. h
Let us note that in order to obtain implications 1, 2, 3, 4, we have to apply residuation at some point. Moreover, in the last
case of the proposition, the intuitionistic negation  can be replaced by a paraconsistent one ÿ, as they are mutually
definable.
The reader may question the significance of the results in this section. As said earlier, on the one hand, we may consider
that three-valued logic looks as basic to human reasoning as Boolean logic, in the sense that it relies on the most elementary
bipolar scale, and that bipolarity is known to be a basic feature in the study of cognitive processes (see [28] and the special
issue containing this paper). Moreover, many interpretations of the third truth-value listed in the introduction have been
proposed in intuitively natural contexts. Most of them (except for the case of undefined) are consistent with the conditions
posed here to define implications and conjunctions, namely monotonicity and reduction to classical logic on {T,F}. While
each of these interpretations may lead us to define specific three-valued connectives, what is proved here is that we always
obtain fragments of a single three-valued algebraic structure, where all 28 connectives (and three negations) can be obtained
from very few of them. Especially, the structure defined by means of Łukasiewicz implication seems to cover them all. Hence,
instead of viewing three-valued logics as different unrelated structures, we are led to consider each of them as a fragment of
a unique larger structure (e.g. a three-valued MV-algebra). Note that a similar role is given to Boolean algebras in the two-
valued case: one may consider the fragment obtained by conjunction and disjunction only, or the structure based on
exclusive or. Still, Boolean algebra appears as the unified framework. Our paper suggests that the same unique structure
can account for three-valued truth-tables extending Boolean ones in a consistent manner, which may potentially be useful
for unifying the various three-valued logic systems.
5. Relationship with functional completeness
It is known since Rosser and Turquette [51] that any binary connective can be defined in Łukasiewicz logic provided the
third value N is included in the language. They proved the following result:
Proposition 9. Let L ¼ ð3;!11; F;NÞ be three-valued Łukasiewicz logic plus the value N. Then, any binary connective can be
defined in L.
They establish this proposition for n-valued Łukasiewicz logic, where N is the truth-value next to T. Their proof is com-
plex, and we give a simpler account of this result below, in the three-valued case. First, we can define the following
operations
:p ¼ p!11 F involutive negation
p q ¼ :p!11 q bounded sum
p q ¼ :ð:p :qÞ Łukasiewicz conjunction
p _ q ¼ ðp!11 qÞ !11 q lattice disjunction
p ^ q ¼ :ð:p _ :qÞ lattice conjunction
rp ¼ :p!11 p ¼ p p possibility
Dp ¼ :ðr:pÞ ¼ p p necessity
Now, for each of the nine possible combinations of two values x; y 2 3, we define a function cTx;yðp; qÞ which takes value T
when x = p and y = q, and Fotherwise. Then, we can define a function which instead of T takes value N as
cNx;yðp; qÞ :¼ N  c
T
x;yðp; qÞ. Finally, we can sum, either with  or with _, these functions to obtain T or N where desired and
F otherwise. The functions cTx;y are defined in Table 9.
Finally, the function equal to F for all x, y is obtained by the conjunction of any two functions cTx;y.
Example 5. Let us consider two conjunctions, which we already know to not satisfy Definition 1: weak Kleene and McCarty
conjunctions. In the case of weak Kleene logic, the interpretation of the third value is undefined and the conjunction truth
table is given in Table 10.
It can be defined in Łukasiewicz logic +N in accordance with the proof of the above proposition as:
N  ½ðrðpÞ ^rð:qÞÞ  Dð:pÞ_
N  ½ðrðpÞ ^rð:pÞÞ  Dð:qÞ_
N  ½ðrp ^rð:pÞÞ  ðrq ^rð:qÞÞ_
N  ½Dq ðrp ^rð:pÞÞ_
N  ½Dp ðrq ^rð:qÞÞ_
½Dðp qÞ
or more simply as:
N  ½ðrðqÞ ^rð:qÞÞ _ ðrp ^rð:pÞÞ _ Dðp qÞ:
Table 9
Table defining function cTx;y , missing values are obtained by commutativity.
cTx;y F N T
F D(:p  :q)
N (r(p) ^r(:p))  D(:q) [rp ^r(:p)]  [rq ^r(:q)]
T D(p  :q) Dp  [rq ^r(:q)] D(p  q)
Table 10
Weak Kleene conjunction.
In the theory of computation by McCarthy, N is the value given to a process that does not terminate. As such, if in the con-
junction p⁄MCq, we first try to compute p and it does not terminate, then also the value of the whole proposition remains
undefined. However, if p = F then the conjunction is false irrespective of the value of q. This process motivates the non-com-
mutative conjunction in Table 11.
Its definition in Łukasiewic logic +N is as follows3:
N  ½ðrp ^rð:pÞÞ  Dð:qÞ_
N  ½ðrp ^rð:pÞÞ  ðrq ^rð:qÞÞ_
N  ½Dq ðrp ^rð:pÞÞ_
N  ½Dp ½rq ^rð:qÞ_
Dðp qÞ
or as N  [(rp ^r(:p)) _ D p  (rq ^r(:q))] _ D(p  q).
In [37], it is proved that in a many-valued logic with ^ and _ it is enough to have functional completeness for unary oper-
ators in order to have functional completeness for n-ary operators with nP 2. Once we are able to prove the unary complete-
ness, the author gives a constructive procedure to build any other function (Lemma 1 in [37]). Then, the author proposes a
notion of normal form understood as a formula which contains ^, _ and unary operators, with no binary operators in the
scope of a unary one and no disjunction (_) in the scope of a conjunction (^). Now, while Łukasiewicz logic plus the constant
N is functionally complete, it is not canonically complete, that is, not any function can be defined using only formulas in nor-
mal form. However, if we add the necessity operator, i.e., we use (^,_,:,N,D), canonical completeness is obtained:
Proposition 10. Let L ¼ ð3;!11;:;N;DÞ be three-valued Łukasiewicz logic plus the value N and necessity operator D. Then, any
unary connective can be defined in L in a normal form.
Proof. It is enough to show that we can represent in normal form the three functions of the following table
p J1TðpÞ J
2
TðpÞ J
3
TðpÞ
F F F T
N F T F
T T F F
Now, J1TðpÞ ¼ DðpÞ; J
2
TðpÞ ¼ :Dð:pÞ ^ :DðpÞ and J
3
TðpÞ ¼ Dð:pÞ. h
Now, using the above result and according to [37, Lemma 1], we can build a table similar to Table 9 as
cTx;y F N T
F D(:p) ^ D(:q)
N :D(:p) ^ :Dp ^D(: q) :D(:p) ^ :Dp ^ : D(:q) ^ :Dq
T Dp ^ D(:q) Dp ^ : D(:q) ^ :Dq Dp ^ Dq
In the previous sections, we focused on three-valued logics extending classical logic, that is, whose truth tables coincide
with Boolean connectives for Boolean entries. We can call extended Boolean function, any such function f:3n? 3 whose
restriction to {T,F} ranges on {T,F}. From the fact that Łukasiewicz logic is meant to encode extended Boolean functions only,
it is impossible to define in it any function which violates this restriction. The fact that in Łukasiewicz logic we can represent
only extended Boolean functions is valid for any number of truth values (and for any set of designated values). Indeed, this
was already observed by Rosser and Turquette [51] in their book. After defining functions Jk(p) = T if k = p and 0 otherwise for
Table 11
McCarthy conjunction.
3 For the sake of completeness we note that from residuation of both the conjunctions ⁄wK and ⁄MC we get Gödel implication.
all truth values k, they observe that any statement which is built using only ? and : is such that its corresponding truth
function f(x1, . . . , xn) always takes the value T or F if only the values T or F are assigned to x1, . . . , xn. And in order to obtain
functional completeness they are obliged to add the constant function next to T (here N) as an extra primitive.
All extended Boolean functions are of course definable by Propositions 9 or 10. If the value N must be obtained when one
of the argument, call it p, has value N, then it is enough to form the conjunction with p in the desired position. For instance, to
define a binary function f(p,q) such that f(T,N) = N it is sufficient, according to Proposition 10, to consider the function
[D(p) ^ :D(q) ^ :D(:q)] ^ q which exactly returns N when the input is (T,N) and F otherwise. However our results in the
paper differ from functional completeness in the above sense, as we establish the possibility, in the three-valued case, to
generate all extended Boolean functions from a few elementary such functions, showing the unity of the formal framework
for three-valued extensions of classical logic.
6. Conclusion
This paper is a preliminary attempt to clarify the connections between three-valued logics extending classical logic, from
a truth-table point of view. As we have seen, basic connectives in such three-valued systems are mathematically connected
together and they can all be defined starting from very simple algebraic structures.
On this basis, these relationships should be exploited with respect also to their significance in knowledge representation
in order to better understand which connectives make more sense in reference to the intended meaning of the third value, as
reviewed in the introduction. In this way, we will be able to relate as many three-valued calculi as possible to a class of appli-
cations where the third truth-value makes sense. This contrasts with many previous studies whose focus was essentially
syntactic and proof-theoretic. The latter point of view is clearly instrumental for mechanizing three-valued reasoning tasks,
but such machineries need sound appropriate canonical examples to be accepted and properly applied.
More recently, we have studied a case when an epistemic flavor is attached to the third value, interpreted as unknown,
thus referring to the idea of lack of knowledge. In this case, a translation from the three-valued logic framework into an ade-
quate epistemic logic setting encapsulating classical propositional logic has been provided, namely the subjective fragment
of S5 modal logic with no nested modality [6]. First results [18] indicate that Łukasiewicz logic is equivalent to a fragment of
this modal logic, where modalities only apply to litterals. They suggest that any three-valued extension of classical propo-
sitional logic as studied in the present paper can be captured by this modal fragment, which lays bare the intuitive meaning
of three-valued formulas when the third truth-value refers to the idea of unknown. It offers a bridge between epistemic logics
and three-valued logics of incomplete information. Other translations of our three-valued setting can be envisaged, properly
choosing the target language, for other understandings of the third truth-value.
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